A Deliberative Approach to Causation
2017 . Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 95(3): 686–708.
Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for believing she’ll stay dry. This correspondence explains why causation matters: knowledge of causal structure helps us make decisions that are evidence of outcomes we seek. The account also explains why we can control the future and not the past, and why causes come before their effects. When agents properly deliberate, their decisions can never count as evidence for any outcomes they may seek in the past. From this it follows that causal relations don’t run backwards. This deliberative asymmetry is itself traced back to asymmetries of evidence and entropy, providing a new way of deriving causal asymmetry from temporally symmetric laws.
Varieties of Epistemic Freedom
2016, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 94(4): 736-751.
When we deliberate about what to do, we appear free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent’s ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we’re ignorant of what we’ll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.
Time, Flies, and Why We Can't Control the Past
Forthcoming, in Barry Loewer, Eric Winsberg and Brad Weslake (eds.) Time's Arrows and the Probability Structure of the World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
David Albert explains why we can typically influence the future but not the past by appealing to an initial low-entropy state of the universe. And he argues that in the rare cases where we can influence the past, we cannot use this influence to knowingly gain future rewards: so it does not constitute control. I introduce an important new case in which Albert's account implies we can not only influence the past but control it: a case where our actions in the present are reliably correlated with several events in the present and past. To deal with such cases, we need to appeal to epistemic conditions on deliberation: being agents requires our decisions being epistemically undetermined at the time we make them. In a world with the past-hypothesis, this implies that deliberation will typically come prior to decision. Once deliberation in this direction is established, correlations towards the past cannot then be exploited for control. To explain why we cannot effectively control the past, we need to appeal to deliberation, whether as part of a defence of Albert's account, or used independently to explain the asymmetry of control.
A Deliberative Account of Causation: How the Evidence of Deliberating Agents Accounts for Causation and its Temporal Direction
PhD Dissertation, Columbia University (2016)
I develop and defend a deliberative account of causation: causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. For example, Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is grounds for thinking she’ll stay dry. I defend the account in the form of a biconditional that relates causal relations to evidential relations and constrains metaphysical accounts of causation, including reductive accounts. Surely we need science to investigate causal structure. But we can’t justify any particular account independently of its relevance for us. Drawing on philosophy of action and decision theory, I develop an epistemic model of deliberation that explains our freedom in deliberation in terms of ordinary beliefs. I then develop this model into a deliberative account of causation: causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need in deliberation. This account explains why causal relations should matter to us, why we deliberate on the future and not the past, and even why causes come prior in time to their effects.
Full dissertation abstract.
Full dissertation abstract.
A paper on attitude asymmetries and the metaphysics of time <Title redacted>
Draft
There are temporal asymmetries in our attitudes towards the past and future. We judge, for example, that a given amount of work is worth twice as much compensation if it is described as taking place in the future, compared to the past (Caruso et al 2008). Does this temporal value asymmetry support a tensed metaphysics of time? By getting clear on the asymmetry’s features, I’ll argue that it doesn’t. To support a tensed metaphysics, the value asymmetry would need to a) not vary with temporal distance, b) apply equally to events concerning oneself and others, and c) be both rational and judged to be so. But evidence suggests the value asymmetry varies with temporal distance, is partially first personal, and is judged irrational even by subjects whose judgements display the asymmetry. There are, moreover, independent arguments against its rationality. The asymmetry’s features suggest instead that it arises as an emotion-driven overgeneralisation from a temporal bias concerning our future actions. This explanation points towards mechanisms that can play a role in explaining other instances where we generalise about the past and future, and, ultimately, why we’re tempted towards metaphysical pictures of time in the first place.
There are temporal asymmetries in our attitudes towards the past and future. We judge, for example, that a given amount of work is worth twice as much compensation if it is described as taking place in the future, compared to the past (Caruso et al 2008). Does this temporal value asymmetry support a tensed metaphysics of time? By getting clear on the asymmetry’s features, I’ll argue that it doesn’t. To support a tensed metaphysics, the value asymmetry would need to a) not vary with temporal distance, b) apply equally to events concerning oneself and others, and c) be both rational and judged to be so. But evidence suggests the value asymmetry varies with temporal distance, is partially first personal, and is judged irrational even by subjects whose judgements display the asymmetry. There are, moreover, independent arguments against its rationality. The asymmetry’s features suggest instead that it arises as an emotion-driven overgeneralisation from a temporal bias concerning our future actions. This explanation points towards mechanisms that can play a role in explaining other instances where we generalise about the past and future, and, ultimately, why we’re tempted towards metaphysical pictures of time in the first place.
I Think, therefore I Will: Fichte and the Unity of Practical and Theoretical Reason
Draft
We engage in the world practically, by acting and willing, as well as theoretically, by thinking and believing. Understanding how these activities relate is essential for understanding deliberation and the kind of agency we have. In this paper, I argue for three important insights for this project from the German Idealist J. G. Fichte. Fichte argues for a unity between practical and theoretical reason, a unity revealed by an equivalence in deliberation between thinking and willing—to will an act is equally to think one so wills. Fichte’s account is a surprising earlier forerunner to contemporary accounts that identify decisions as beliefs. But he correctly realises that such an equivalence does not reduce practical to theoretical reason, explain practical freedom in theoretical terms, or support incompatible practical and theoretical perspectives. These insights are important for understanding freedom and belief generally. But they’re particularly relevant for understanding the limits of contemporary attempts to explain our freedom in epistemic terms.
We engage in the world practically, by acting and willing, as well as theoretically, by thinking and believing. Understanding how these activities relate is essential for understanding deliberation and the kind of agency we have. In this paper, I argue for three important insights for this project from the German Idealist J. G. Fichte. Fichte argues for a unity between practical and theoretical reason, a unity revealed by an equivalence in deliberation between thinking and willing—to will an act is equally to think one so wills. Fichte’s account is a surprising earlier forerunner to contemporary accounts that identify decisions as beliefs. But he correctly realises that such an equivalence does not reduce practical to theoretical reason, explain practical freedom in theoretical terms, or support incompatible practical and theoretical perspectives. These insights are important for understanding freedom and belief generally. But they’re particularly relevant for understanding the limits of contemporary attempts to explain our freedom in epistemic terms.
Freedom, Self-Prediction and the Possibility of Time Travel
Draft
Clear-thinking metaphysicians have argued that agents retain their normal freedom and abilities when they travel back in time (Lewis, Horwich, Sider). Time-travelling-Tim can shoot and kill his young grandfather, his younger self, or whomever he pleases—and so, it seems can reasonably deliberate about whether to do these things. He might not succeed—but he is still just as free as a similar non-time-traveller. But what agents can reasonably deliberate on is sensitive to their beliefs. According to a plausible ignorance condition, agents must be uncertain of what they will do if they are to reasonably deliberate. This creates a rational constraint on the time-traveller’s freedom. Tim can’t reasonably deliberate on killing his grandfather, certain that he’ll fail. With this constraint, time-travellers’ abilities to deliberate and decide are significantly curtailed. This constraint help makes sense of our competing intuitions about how to evaluate counterfactuals in such cases. And it implies that the evidential structure of the actual world sustains our ordinary freedom to deliberate.
Clear-thinking metaphysicians have argued that agents retain their normal freedom and abilities when they travel back in time (Lewis, Horwich, Sider). Time-travelling-Tim can shoot and kill his young grandfather, his younger self, or whomever he pleases—and so, it seems can reasonably deliberate about whether to do these things. He might not succeed—but he is still just as free as a similar non-time-traveller. But what agents can reasonably deliberate on is sensitive to their beliefs. According to a plausible ignorance condition, agents must be uncertain of what they will do if they are to reasonably deliberate. This creates a rational constraint on the time-traveller’s freedom. Tim can’t reasonably deliberate on killing his grandfather, certain that he’ll fail. With this constraint, time-travellers’ abilities to deliberate and decide are significantly curtailed. This constraint help makes sense of our competing intuitions about how to evaluate counterfactuals in such cases. And it implies that the evidential structure of the actual world sustains our ordinary freedom to deliberate.
Time Travel and Counterfactual Asymmetry
Draft
How should we evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in cases of backwards time travel? We ordinarily evaluate counterfactuals and abilities by holding the past fixed and keeping the future open. Your decision to eat the cake may be counterfactually correlated with the cake’s being eaten, but not its being there in the first place. You might be unable to eat the cake given you had a dental operation yesterday, but not given that you don’t. Lewis, Sider and others argue that these temporal asymmetries persists even in cases of backwards time travel. Holding the future fixed amounts to fatalism, and is no different from doing so in ordinary cases. I’ll argue that these asymmetries should be given up in cases of backwards time travel. The past shouldn’t be held past fixed, because backwards time travel implies backwards counterfactual dependence. Parts of the future should be held fixed, because they’re in the causal and evidential history of the past. We need temporally neutral methods for evaluating counterfactuals and abilities to ultimately explain causal asymmetry in the actual world.
How should we evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in cases of backwards time travel? We ordinarily evaluate counterfactuals and abilities by holding the past fixed and keeping the future open. Your decision to eat the cake may be counterfactually correlated with the cake’s being eaten, but not its being there in the first place. You might be unable to eat the cake given you had a dental operation yesterday, but not given that you don’t. Lewis, Sider and others argue that these temporal asymmetries persists even in cases of backwards time travel. Holding the future fixed amounts to fatalism, and is no different from doing so in ordinary cases. I’ll argue that these asymmetries should be given up in cases of backwards time travel. The past shouldn’t be held past fixed, because backwards time travel implies backwards counterfactual dependence. Parts of the future should be held fixed, because they’re in the causal and evidential history of the past. We need temporally neutral methods for evaluating counterfactuals and abilities to ultimately explain causal asymmetry in the actual world.